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I. INTRODUCTION
Bonnie and Clyde are not the only individuals to have ever jointly
conducted their banking business; they were simply the most notorious.
Everywhere, and by almost everyone, deposits and withdrawals are
being made to and from "joint deposit accounts."
Individuals establish joint deposit accounts for varied reasons. The
account may be established for the banking convenience of a couple.
The account may be established by one person to deposit a cash gift
for another, but over which the benefactor will retain control so that
the other person named on the account will receive the money only for
a specific purpose or at a specific time. The account may be "a poor
man's will;" that is, established so that upon the depositor's death, the
account will be paid to the other party named on the account.' Again,
the reasons for having two names on a deposit account are numerous.
For the sake of administrative ease, however, banks2 prefer to
1. See John W. Fisher, 11, Joint Tenancy in West Virginia: A Progressive Court
Looks at Traditional Property Rights, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 267, 287 (1989). Specifically,
"[flor more than half a century, the courts of this country have struggled to discover wheth-
er a joint deposit bank account with an extended right of survivorship, sometimes called a
'poor man's will,' is a gift, trust, a contract, or joint tenancy, or a testamentary disposition."
Id. (quoting Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. CHI. L.
REv. 376, 401 (1958-1959)).
2. For the author's convenience, the term "banks" will be used to refer, generally, to
all financial institutions that accept deposits. The reader is cautioned, however, that the law
[V/ol. 97:287
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handle all deposits uniformly notwithstanding the intent of the deposi-
tor. This preference is not simply for the benefit of the bank. Lower
administrative costs enable the bank to offer lower rates on loans be-
cause the margin required for a profit is lower when the bank's ex-
penses are lower. In the alternate, the bank can offer the avoided ex-
penses of administration in the form of higher rates of interest on
deposit accounts. Accordingly, uniformity in the treatment of deposit
accounts benefits the customers of the bank as well as the bank.
A tension potentially exists between the bank and customer with
respect to the joint deposit account: The customer may have a specifi-
cally intended purpose for his or her account that may conflict with
the bank's desire for uniformity in the handling of such accounts. For
example, an elderly person may require the assistance of a relative,
friend, or other person in the administration of the elderly person's
financial affairs. In the furtherance of such assistance, a deposit ac-
count is established at the elderly person's financial institution in the
name of both the elderly person and the individual who has been asked
or who has volunteered to provide the needed assistance. While the
elderly person intended to do no more than give the other individual a
limited power to write checks on, or make withdrawals from, the ac-
count on the elderly person's behalf, the bank's standard form of con-
tract for a joint account probably permitted the assisting individual to
make withdrawals for any purpose and probably provided that the
assisting individual would receive the balance of the account on the
death of the elderly person. Again, a tension potentially exists between
the customer and the bank because of a divergence between the
customer's intent in establishing a joint account and the bank's intent
in administering the account.
This Article focuses on this divergence. First, the law governing
deposit accounts, generally, and joint deposit accounts, specifically, will
be reviewed. Second, a different analysis of joint accounts will be
proposed which focuses on the issues of ownership, control and enti-
tlement. Third, a means of melding the customer's intent in establish-
ing an account on which other individuals will be named and the
governing a specific type of institution should be consulted before accepting the author's
conclusions in this Article.
1995]
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bank's ability to maintain the deposit account will be discussed, includ-
ing the need for additional legislation to facilitate this result. And fi-
nally, a broad outline of a policy for banks to follow in establishing
joint deposit accounts will be set forth.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW GOVERNING JOINT DEPOSIT
ACCOUNTS
A. The Deposit Account
A statutory definition provides that "deposit account means a de-
mand, time, savings, passbook or like account maintained with a bank,
savings and. loan association, credit union or like organization, other
than an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit."3 This definition
is not particularly meaningful. In fact, one senses that the drafters of
the definition believed that a deposit account was known to all and
need not be explained. This belief is well founded, for everyone's
experience includes establishing and using an account at a bank, most
typically a checking or a savings account
From a legal perspective, a more meaningful definition of a de-
posit account is given by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia. In the case of Southern Electric Supply Co. v. Raleigh County,
National Bank' the court decreed that "[a] bank account creates a
3. W. VA. CODE § 46-9-105(e) (1993). This definition is principally provided to fur-
ther the exception of the pledge of deposit accounts from governance by the provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code - Secured Transactions, W. VA. CODE §§ 46-9-101 et seq.
(1993). The exception to the definition for accounts which are evidenced by certificates of
deposit is not significant in that the exception merely reflects that the effective pledge, or
encumbrance, of certificated accounts will be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
For purposes of this article, no difference exists between deposit accounts which are evi-
denced by a certificate and those accounts which are not.
4. As the Court in a seminal case on deposit-account law opined, "[m]odem society
virtually demands that one maintain a bank account of some sort. 'In a sense a person is
defined by the checks he writes. By examining them . . . [one] get[s] to know his doctors,
lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational interests,
the papers and magazines he reads, and so on Ad infinitum."' Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller,
408 A.2d 758, 762 (Md. App. 1979) (quoting California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 85 (1974)).
5. Southern Elec. Supply Co. v. Raleigh County, Nat'l Bank, 320 S.E.2d 515 (W.
4
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contractual debtor-creditor relationship between bank and depositor. A
bank takes title to funds on deposit and becomes a debtor for that
amount to the depositor, the customer, who becomes the bank's credi-
tor.
' 6
In a more recent case, the court confirmed this definition, stating:
"Where there is a general deposit of money in a bank, the title to and
beneficial ownership of the money is vested in the bank, and the rela-
tion between it and the depositor is that of debtor and creditor."7 The
significance of the contractual nature of the relationship is that: "A
deposit creates an ordinary debt, and not a privilege or right of a fidu-
ciary character."8
The essence of a deposit account is the delivery by an individual
of money or its equivalent to a bank. The customer expects repayment
of the money, typically upon his or her demand and upon the terms
and conditions set forth in a deposit contract. The consumer is a cred-
itor; that is, a person to whom an obligation is owed. The bank is the
debtor; that is, the one who owes the obligation. Interestingly, the term
"account" is appropriate because the deposit creates, essentially, an ac-
count receivable for the depositor and an account payable for the bank.
The contractual nature of the depositor/bank relationship is most
pertinent to the analysis of the joint deposit account.
B. The Joint Deposit Account
Tautologically, the "joint deposit account" is a type of deposit ac-
count. For this reason, the joint deposit account creates a contractual
relationship between the bank and the depositors. For many individuals
and banks, however, the joint deposit account is perceived as simply a
deposit account for which two names are noted on the signature line of
the deposit contract. The remaining provisions of the deposit contract
are simply ignored by both parties. The customer leaves the bank be-
Va. 1984).
6. Id. at 519 (citations omitted).
7. Peters v. Peters, 443 S.E.2d 213, 219 (W. Va. 1994) (citations omitted).
8. Id. (citations omitted).
1995]
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lieving that his or her unstated purpose in having two parties named to
the account will be served. The bank says "thank you" to the customer
intending to administer the account as it administers any such account,
unaware that the customer had other thoughts. Essentially, the deposit
contract serves solely as a signature card, and it is this "signature card
mentality" of both customer and bank that may very well put the bank
and customer at eventual odds.
Again, the joint account is a deposit account. As previously stated,
the principal interest of the owner of a deposit account is the contrac-
tual right to demand payment from the bank of the amount originally
deposited (the right of withdrawal) or to order the bank to pay an
amount to a third party (the right to draw checks upon the account).
Accordingly, a definition of a "joint deposit account" might be an
account for which two or more parties, jointly, are entitled to demand
or order the bank's payment of the account balance. This restrictive
definition is probably not satisfactory to either the customer or the
bank.
A depositor may want another party to be able to write checks on
the account, but only for the depositor's benefit. A depositor may want
another party to be able to withdraw funds from the account, but
again, only for the depositor's benefit. A depositor may want the funds
in the account to go to another party for that party's benefit, but only
after a condition has been met, perhaps the death of the depositor. A
depositor may, in fact, want another party to use the funds in that
party's discretion and for that party's own purposes. These varying
concepts must somehow be reconciled with the concept of a joint de-
posit account.
Similarly, the bank does not want to monitor the account to de-
termine if two signatures have been obtained in a transaction. Auto-
mation in the processing of checks would be hindered. Many checks
are processed on the faith that the necessary signatures are contained
on the checks and on the assumption that a certain amount of loss can
be tolerated. Two signature requirements amidst the large volume of
consumer accounts would truly be the administrative nightmare.
The obvious challenge in defiming a joint deposit account, there-
fore, is accommodating all the various attributes that individuals desire
292 [Vol. 97:287
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from such accounts while accommodating the bank's desire for ease in
the administration of such accounts. The basic truth which quickly
emerges from this discussion is that a joint deposit account defies any
simple description.
The author proposes that a more pragmatic analysis of the joint
deposit account be undertaken in which the focus is on three issues
ownership, control and entitlement.
For the purposes of this analysis, "ownership" in the context of a
deposit account refers to the interest of the person to whom the obliga-
tion of the bank represented by the account is owed. The "joint" own-
ership of an account means that two or more individuals are the credi-
tors of the bank with respect to the account.
For the purposes of this analysis, "control" in the context of a
deposit account means that an individual can demand or direct payment
by the bank of its obligation to the depositor, either through withdraw-
al or by the writing of a check. An owner may have control, but not
necessarily. For example, a minor may "own!' the account, but the par-
ent or other guardian may "control" the demand or order for the
bank's payment of the obligation to or on behalf of the minor.9 An-
other example may be a person who is given authority to pay amounts
on behalf of the owner, such as the neighbor who assists his or her
elderly friend with the payment of bills, but who is not intended to
have the use of the funds for his or her own benefit.1" Essentially,
control means the ability of an individual to demand the payment of
an obligation on behalf of an owner, but not to demand payment for
the individual's own purpose or benefit unless the individual is also an
owner.
For the purposes of this analysis, "entitlement" in the context of a
deposit account means the right to receive payment from the bank of
an account balance due to the fulfillment of a condition to such pay-
ment. The individual with such entitlement is not an owner until the
condition is satisfied and is unable to control the payment of the obli-
gation until, again, the condition is satisfied. An obvious example of
9. Such an account will be discussed later in this Article.
10. Such an account will be discussed later in this Article.
1995]
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such an entitlement is the person who is entitled to payment from the
bank of an account balance by reason of the death of the owner."
Using the concepts of ownership, control and entitlement, the au-
thor believes that a more pragmatic analysis of the joint deposit ac-
count can be undertaken.
C. The West Virginia Banking Statute
Justice Neeley referred to the provisions of W. VA. CODE § 31A-
4-33 as the "'West Virginia Banking Statute" and, indeed, all case law
concerning joint deposit accounts begins with the review of, and ends
with the application or distinction of, this statute.' The statute pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
When a deposit is made by any person in the name of such depositor and
another or others and in form to be paid to any one of such depositors, or
the survivor or survivors of them, such deposit, and any additions thereto,
made by any of such persons, upon the making thereof, shall become the
property of such persons as joint tenants. All such deposits, together with
all interest thereon, shall be held for the exclusive use of the persons so
named, and may be paid to any one of them during the lifetime of them,
or to the survivor or survivors after the death of any of them. 3
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has found the West
Virginia Banking Statute to be "clear, unambiguous and ... [in need
of] no construction" and, furthermore, has determined that the provi-
sions were enacted to "protect banking institutions."' 4 But from what
exactly does the statute protect the bank? The answer to this question
is facilitated by reviewing the provisions of the statute in terms of
ownership, control and entitlement.
11. Such an account will be discussed later in this Article.
12. Peters, 443 S.E.2d at 217.
13. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(b) (Supp. 1994).
14. Lett v. Twentieth St. Bank, 77 S.E.2d 813, 814 (W. Va. 1953). Lett dealt with
the provisions of the West Virginia Banking Statute before the statute's present codification
in chapter thirty-one-a of the Code. The recodification of the statute left intact the provi-
sions to which reference has been made in the text.
[Vol. 97:287
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By its terms, the statute requires that certain conditions must first
be met before the statute applies to a joint deposit account. Specifi-
cally, the statute requires that the deposit have (i) the attribute of
"joint" ownership - "a deposit is made by any person in the name of
such depositor and another or others;" 5 (ii) the attribute of "joint"
control - "in form to be paid to any one of such depositors;"1 and
(iii) the attribute of "joint" entitlement - "in form to be paid to . . .
the survivor or survivors of [any one of such depositors]." 7 Essential-
ly, the West Virginia Banking Statute contemplates that a joint deposit
account is, for the statute's purposes, an account in which all parties to
the deposit contract have a coincidence of ownership, control and enti-
tlement.
Because the statute contemplates a coincidence of ownership and
entitlement between or among the depositors, it is not surprising that
the West Virginia Banking Statute provides that the interest in the
account becomes property of the depositors as joint tenants, for the
well-settled definition of a "joint tenancy with right of survivorship" is
"an estate in West Virginia where '[e]ach joint tenant owns the whole
estate subject to the equal rights of ownership of his cotenants. They
all own the property as an entity and when one dies those left still
own it as an entity."'1 8 Again, the West Virginia Banking Statute re-
quires, for the application of its provisions, that all parties to the ac-
count have the attribute of ownership and the attribute of entitlement
(that is, the right of survivorship) - thus mirroring the attributes of a
joint tenancy with a right of survivorship.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has credited the
West Virginia Banking Statute with "creat[ing] certain property rights
in all of the depositors named in a savings account."' 9 The court has
also credited the statute with "restor[ing] the element of survivorship as
15. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(b) (Supp. 1994).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Fisher, supra note 1, at 268 (quoting Brown, Some Aspects of Joint Ownership of
Real Property in West Virginia, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 207 (1961)).
19. Lett, 77 S.E.2d at 814.
295
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to joint deposits made in a bank."'2 The statute does not deserve this
lavish credit.
The "primary feature of joint tenancy is survivorship."2 However,
a general statutory presumption is that:
When any joint tenant or tenant by the entireties of an interest in real or
personal property, whether such interest be a present interest, or by way of
reversion or remainder or other future interest, shall die, his share shall
descend or be disposed of as if he had been a tenant in common.22
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has affirmed that
the "substance of. . .[this statute] has been the law of this State since
its formation." '23 Restated, before and after the enactment of the West
Virginia Banking Statute,24 the statutory presumption was that the in-
terest of a joint tenant would pass to the heirs of the tenant, not to the
surviving tenant. No right of survivorship was presumed to exist in a
joint tenancy. Essentially, the primary feature of the common-law joint
tenancy, i.e., survivorship, was seemingly abrogated by this statute.
The Legislature ameliorated the effect of this provision by enacting
the further provision that:
[T]he preceding section [§ 36-1-19] shall not apply to any estate which
joint tenants have as executors or trustees, nor to an estate conveyed or
devised to persons in their own right, when it manifestly appears from the
tenor of the instrument that it was intended that the part of the one dying
should then belong to the others.'
The substance of this provision has also been in existence since the
"formation of the State. 26
Accordingly, the statutory law of this state was, at the time the
West Virginia Banking Statute was enacted, and remains, that a joint
20. Id. at 815.
21. Brown, supra note 18, at 208.
22. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-19 (1985).
23. DeLong v. Farmers Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 137 S.E.2d 11, 14 (W. Va. 1964).
24. The West Virginia Banking Statute was codified in 1919.
25. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-20(a) (1985).
26. DeLong, 137 S.E.2d at 14.
[Vol. 97:287
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tenancy does not create a right of survivorship, unless the intent to
create such a right is expressly stated. The West Virginia Banking
Statute requires, however, the expression of a survivorship interest in
the making of the deposit before its application. Therefore, the statute
cannot be said to have actually restored the right of survivorship, for it
is the expression of the intent to create such a right that, under the
provisions of W. VA. CODE § 36-1-20, creates the right of survivor-
ship.
If the statute does not restore the element of survivorship as the
court proclaimed, does it create certain property rights as the court fur-
ther proclaimed?
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has dictated that
"[W. VA. CODE §§] 36-1-19 and 20, [the aforementioned provisions]
do not abolish the common law requirement of the four unities in a
joint tenancy."27 Restated, both provisions only apply to a joint tenan-
cy, and, therefore, the expression of intent to create a right of survi-
vorship can be effective only if the required elements of a joint tenan-
cy exist. The four "unities" to which the court made reference have
been described as follows:
[U]nity of time, unity of possession, unity of title and unity of interest. To
have the unity of time the interests of the tenants must vest at the same
time. To have the unity of possession the tenants must have undivided
interests in the whole estate so that each can be said to have an interest in
every square inch of the land. Unity of title means that the tenants must
have obtained their title by the same instrument or by joint adverse pos-
session. Unity of interest means that the tenants must have estates in the
property of the same type, duration and amount. 8
The West Virginia Banking Statute requires for its application that
three of the four unities exist; that is, unity of time, possession and
interest. However, because one party is making a deposit of funds to
which it must be typically assumed the party had the sole interest
before making the deposit, unity of title is missing for the joint depos-
27. Herring v. Carroll, 300 S.E.2d 629, Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 1983).
28. Brown, supra note 18, at 210.
1995] 297
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itors do not :receive title to the deposit under the same instrument, Le.,
the deposit contract.
Unity of title with respect to the deposited funds could be created
by a "straw" conveyance in which the depositor divests his or her
interest to a third party who, by design, immediately reconveys the
funds to the depositor and the other tenants jointly. Having* divested
himself or herself of the funds, the depositor regains title under the
same instrument as the other parties to the account.
By declaring that a joint tenancy exists without an unity of title,
the West Virginia Banking Statute essentially eliminates the require-
ment of the straw conveyance. Indeed, the Legislature in 1981 elim-
inated this need for all transactions, mandating:
Any conveyance or transfer of property, or any interest therein, creating a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship together with the person or per-
sons conveying or transferring such property, executed by such person or
persons to or in favor of another shall be valid to the same extent as a
similar transfer or conveyance from a third party or by a straw party
deed.29
In this fashion, the statute did not create any property rights; it simply
facilitated the parties' intended creation of such rights.
While the court may have overstated the effect of the West Vir-
ginia Banking Statute with respect to joint tenancy, the statute did
create an interest in each joint tenant that did not previously exist; that
is, the attribute of "joint" control. In other words, the statute contem-
plates that the deposit will be made in a form "to be paid to any one
of such depositors." Each joint tenant is to have the ability to demand
from the bank payment of the balance of the account that is owed to
all the tenants or to order the bank's payment to a third party of the
account balance. From the bank's perspective:
[P]ayment to any joint depositor and the receipt or the acquittance of the
one to whom such payment is made shall be a valid and sufficient release
and discharge for all payments made on account of such deposit, prior to
the receipt by the banking institution of notice in writing, signed by any
29. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-20a (1985).
298 [Vol. 97:287
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one of such joint tenants not to pay such deposit in accordance with the
terms thereof. Prior to the receipt of such notice no banking institution
shall be liable for the payment of such sums.3"
Again, this statutory provision gives each tenant the ability to
control the other tenants' interest in the joint deposit account. Typical-
ly, a tenant should only be able to convey his or her interest in the
jointly-held property; that is, an undivided one-half interest." Accord-
ingly, the West Virginia Banking Statute does introduce a new concept
into the joint tenancy - the ability of each tenant to control the pay-
ment of the bank's obligation to all the tenants. 2
The West Virginia Banking Statute's addition to the joint tenancy
of the right of each tenant, independently of the other, to control the
payment of the bank's entire obligation is obviously for the bank's
ease in the administration of such accounts. As Justice Neeley has
noted, to not provide for such right of control "would place a heavy
burden on a bank to mediate between co-depositors, one of the burdens
which the legislature obviously sought to remove by enacting [W. VA.
CODE §] 31A-4-33 [1933] [the West Virginia Banking Statute]."33
Simply, a bank is not required to demand that all tenants of the ac-
count act jointly, but may follow the instructions of any one of the
tenants and by doing so, satisfy its obligation to all the tenants. This
enables a bank to process such accounts as if one depositor existed and
the automation of such processing carries no more risk than the pro-
cessing of a solely owned account.
30. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(c) (Supp. 1994).
31. "Although a joint tenant does not have an inheritable or devisable interest in the
land, he does have an interest which he can convey. So, if three persons own land as joint
tenants and one of them conveys his interest to a fourth person, the grantee takes a one-
third undivided interest as a tenant in common with the two remaining joint tenants."
Brown, supra note 18, at 211 (footnotes omitted). This was subsequently affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia which, by Justice Miller, noted that "[w]e have
not had occasion to directly determine if a joint tenant of real estate may convey his undi-
vided interest," but opined that "[i]t is generally, if not universally, recognized elsewhere
that a joint tenant may convey his undivided interest in real property to a third person."
Herring, 300 S.E.2d at 632.
32. Of course, the tenant is still liable to the remaining tenants for the interests over
which he or she exercised control.
33. Peters, 443 S.E.2d at 217.
299
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In short, the West Virginia Banking Statute contemplates the cre-
ation of a deposit account that has the attribute of joint ownership and
the statute facilitates the creation of a joint tenancy without the need
for a straw conveyance so that the deposit account also has the attrib-
ute of a joint entitlement, or rather, the right of survivorship. The
statute further gives each tenant control over the account which relieves
the bank of the administrative requirement that the tenants act jointly
with respect to the bank's repayment of its obligation.
This joint account as contemplated by the West Virginia Banking
Statute, with the joint attributes of ownership and entitlement, will be
referred to as the "Joint Tenancy Account." And again, the significance
of such an account is that the banking statute provides for the control
of the deposit account by any one of the tenants, thereby easing the
bank's burden of administering the account.
D. The Joint Tenancy Account and the Case Law
Professor Fisher, in his 1989 law review article, thoroughly de-
scribed the debate that raged in the case law and academic literature
about whether the Joint Tenancy Account constituted a "new concept
outside the law of gifts and trusts" or whether it could be construed
under "common law gift terminology." '34 As previously explained, the
West Virginia Banking Statute merely facilitates the creation of a joint
tenancy in a deposit when unity of possession, time, and interest exists
by eliminating the need for an unity of title. This does not create a
property right, but rather pays homage to the common-law form of a
joint tenancy. The statute's elimination of the need for a straw convey-
ance in order to create an unity of title is not unique either, for such a
statute existed in 1974 with respect to property of married couples and
currently exists for all transfers of property." Accordingly, the argu-
ment that a new concept has been created with respect to the Joint
34. Fisher, supra note 1, at 287.
35. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-20a (1985) (Editor's notes - Former, similar law, applica-
ble only to married couples, was codified in former § 48-3-7a). The substance of the statu-
tory provision is set forth infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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Tenancy Account is unfounded except, as discussed, for the right of
control by each tenant over all the jointly-held property.
On the other hand, the scrutiny of the Joint Tenancy Account
under common-law gift terminology seems natural, for the West Vir-
ginia Banking Statute contemplates that "a deposit is made by any
person in the name of such depositor and another or others."36 By
depositing his or her funds to an account held by him or her and oth-
ers, the depositor is evidencing an intent to transfer, potentially without
consideration, interests in the funds.
A careful review of the various court decisions concerning Joint
Tenancy Accounts reveals, however, that the focus on the provisions of
the West Virginia Banking Statute was misplaced, and that what the
court truly was struggling with was the stated focus of this Article.
Did the depositor intend to make the deposit in the form contemplated
by the statute? Restated, did the depositor intend that the remaining
parties to the account have the attributes of ownership and entitlement
and, as a result, the attributes of control provided by the West Virginia
Banking Statute?
The seminal case is Lett v. Twentieth Street Bank.37 In Lett, a
husband and wife added a third party, the husband's sister, to their
deposit account by having the sister execute a signature card for the
account. As a result, the passbook for the account read, essentially,
"husband or wife or husband's sister." As the court noted, "[t]he re-
cord does not show, but it is probable that all of the money so depos-
ited belonged to Boyd Wilson, and that neither his wife nor his sis-
ter . . . owned any part thereof."38 Most significantly, however, the
court noted that "the record fails to show expressly that there was an
intention on the part of Boyd Wilson to create a survivorship for the
benefit of his sister, though there is some indication from the testimo-
ny . . . that Wilson intended that his sister was to receive the money
so deposited."" The question upon the death of the husband and his
36. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(b) (Supp. 1994).
37. Lett v. Twentieth St Bank, 77 S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1953).
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wife was whether the estate of the wife, who survived the husband by
one month, should receive the balance of the account or whether the
sister should. The issue in the case was solely over the issue of entitle-
ment, and not ownership or control as defined for the purposes of this
Article. The court ruled that "[tihe applicable statute requires no con-
struction, and creates a joint tenancy in the deposits made."40 The
court also noted that "[i]n this situation, unless there is some other
reason for denying the plaintiff recovery," the sister held a recognized
entitlement to the account due to the survivorship feature of a joint
tenancy.
4
As previously discussed, the West Virginia Banking Statute did not
create the joint tenancy, but merely facilitated the creation of such
when the intent of the depositor to create a joint tenancy was evi-
denced by the form of the deposit and the terms of the deposit con-
tract. In Lett, the court did not find any reason to believe that the
brother did not effectively make a gift to his sister of some interest in
the money which he deposited. In fact, the court gave significance to
the fact that, in the one month period between the husband's and the
wife's death, the wife did not attempt to withdraw the funds from the
account. The court found that the intent of the depositor was to create
a joint tenancy in the amount deposited and, indeed, having acknowl-
edged the joint tenancy, the court confirmed that the "right of survivor-
ship follows as a matter of course."42
The next significant case with respect to the West Virginia Bank-
ing Statute was Dorsey v. Short.43 In Dorsey, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of 'West Virginia reviewed a joint account maintained by a
bank in the name of a mother and daughter to which deposits had
been made by the mother of money to which she clearly held title
before the deposit. The daughter subsequently withdrew the funds from
the account, or more precisely, demanded payment by the bank of the
obligation which the bank owed jointly to the mother and the daughter
pursuant, presumably, to the contract governing the deposit. The moth-
40. Id. at 816.
41. Id. at 815.
42. 77 S.E.2d at 816.
43. Dorsey v. Short, 205 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1974).
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er sued the daughter and the bank, alleging that the money was her
sole and separate property and that the account was opened in the
name of the mother and daughter at the insistence of the daughter. The
mother further alleged that the daughter encouraged the opening of the
account in this fashion so that the daughter could assist the mother in
the management of the mother's affairs in the event of the mother's
illness. Restated, the mother insisted that only control was to be shared
and that she did not intend to transfer ownership or give an entitlement
to her daughter.
The daughter alleged that the mother had insisted that the account
be opened in both names for the reason that the mother wanted the
daughter to use the money for the construction of a new home. While
the daughter stated that she promised not to use the money in the
account unless absolutely necessary, the necessity apparently arose. In
the language of this article, the daughter insisted that she had joint
ownership and entitlement to the account and control if it became nec-
essary.
The court in Dorsey repeated the language in Lett that the contro-
versy "cannot be determined under the common law rules relating to
gifts but must be resolved under the provisions" of the West Virginia
Banking Statute.' As Professor Fisher correctly emphasizes in his re-
view of the case, however, the court proceeded to discuss the contro-
versy in terms of the "donor" and "donee," which is consistent with
common-law gift terminology.45
The court reviewed various decisions reported in American juris-
prudence and determined that "[a]ll American courts ruling on similar
statutory language have held that such establishment of statutory joint
tenancy can be conditional and that, if the conditions imposed on the
joint deposit are not met, the donor may retain control and even com-
plete ownership of the deposit during the donor's lifetime."" The
44. Dorsey, 205 S.E.2d at 689.
45. Professor Fisher specifically states: "While the court in Dorsey was attempting to
follow the conceptual basis of the Lett decision, its word selection and use of terminology
associated with gifts sowed the seeds for subsequent confusion." Fisher, supra note 1, at
281.
46. Dorsey, 205 S.E.2d at 691.
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Dorsey court then emphasized that in Lett the court had "indicated
there may be some reason for holding no intent to create an unquali-
fied joint inter vivos property right in the joint bank account."47 The
court finally opined that, "[s]ince the essential facts determining wheth-
er conditions were placed on the joint account are in dispute, the prin-
cipal issue in this case can only be resolved by a trier of fact."48
Although Professor Fisher believes the two cases are inconsistent
in their conceptual basis, the court's decisions can be easily reconciled.
Again, the West Virginia Banking Statute merely facilitates the creation
of a joint tenancy when the depositor has intended the creation in
another party of the incidences of entitlement and ownership. The
statute merely gives effect to what, from the deposit contract, must be
presumed to be the intent of the depositors. The reconciliation of the
Lett and Dorsey decisions can be made by use of the concepts of own-
ership and entitlement. In Lett, the discussion concerned the entitle-
ment; that is, whether a right of survivorship existed in the sister after
the death of the husband and wife parties to the contract. The court,
having presumed that joint ownership was intended, properly ruled that
a right of survivorship followed. The court in Lett simply found no
reason to question the original intent of the husband to transfer to his
sister an interest in the ownership of, and entitlement to, the amounts
deposited in the bank account.
In Dorsey, the discussion concerned ownership; that is, whether
ownership of the deposited funds and resulting account balance was
intended to be transferred by one depositor to the other party to the
account. Did the mother, by making deposits to the account to which
her daughter was a party, intend to transfer ownership in the account
to the daughter and thus create a joint tenancy? For the Dorsey court,
the significance of the West Virginia Banking Statute was that it creat-
ed a presumption of a gift when a deposit was made by "any person
in the name of such depositor and another or others."49
Indeed, a syllabus point of the court in Dorsey was that:
47. Id. at 691.
48. Id. at 692.
49. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(b) (Supp. 1994).
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[W. VA. CODE §] 31A-4-33 [1931,] as amended, creates, in the absence of
fraud, mistake or other equally serious fault, a conclusive presumption that
the donor depositor of a joint and survivorship bank account intended a
causa mortis gift of the proceeds remaining in the account after his death
to the surviving joint tenant."
Again, this is an overstatement of the effect of the statute, for the
requirement of the statute is that the deposit be "made by any person
in the name of such depositor and another or others" and it is the form
of the deposit, not the statute, which creates the presumption.5
Essentially, no conflict between Lett and Dorsey exists. Lett did
not question the co-ownership of the funds, but whether the right of
survivorship existed between the two joint tenants. The Lett court de-
termined that under the provisions of the West Virginia Banking Stat-
ute a joint tenancy existed and, therefore, a right of survivorship fol-
lowed. The Dorsey court was faced with whether the statute had appli-
cation at all, because the intended ownership of funds was at question,
and this issue necessarily gave rise to whether the mother had intended
the gift of her money to the daughter. The court ruled that if the
mother had established a condition to the gift, then the daughter would
have no incident of ownership. Without such an incident of ownership,
the West Virginia Banking Statute would not apply and no joint tenan-
cy with right of survivorship could be created.52
Therefore, the issue in these cases both came down to the intent
of the depositor - was ownership intended to be transferred, or rather,
was a gift of an interest of one party to the remaining parties intend-
ed? This same question was answered yes in Lett and no in Dorsey,
but the significance is that essentially the same question was asked.
50. Dorsey, 205 S.E.2d at 687, Syl. Pt.2.
51. In fact, one form of deposit contract expressly provides that "any funds placed in
or added to the account by any one of the parties are and shall conclusively be intended to
be a gift and delivery at the time of deposit of such funds to the other signatory party or
parties to the extent of his or their pro rata interest in the account."
52. Of course, one significant difference between Lett and Dorsey was that in Lett, the
original depositor was not alive and, thus, could not indicate that his intent was other than
to make a gift of the funds. In Dorsey, the mother was alive and could speak to the issue
of whether it was her intent to make an unconditional gift.
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Another common thread between the two cases is very significant
and should not be ignored. In neither case did the bank apparently
incur liability. This presumably has to do with the fact that the West
Virginia Banking Statute permitted the bank to deal indiscriminately
with either of the parties in discharging its liability with respect to the
accounts.
In recognizing, however, that both cases dealt with the intent of
the depositors, the question arises: What if a depositor discusses with
the bank that it is not his or her intent to give an ownership or enti-
tlement interest to an account, but, instead, the intent is merely to give
control to the other party? If the bank then executes the standard form
of contract providing for joint ownership and entitlement, a contract
has been executed which does not reflect either the intent of the de-
positor or the promise of the bank.
In the case of Webb v. Williams," the issue was whether the son,
who was a party to a depository account jointly with his father, should
receive the balance of the account after his father's death or should the
son and two other heirs receive the balance of the account under the
provisions of the father's will. Evidence was presented that, "it had not
been the policy of the bank, until very recently, to explain in detail the
nature of a joint account with the right of survivorship." 4 Moreover,
the bank's representative testified that the depositor was laboring under
the misimpression that "it was necessary to place someone else's name
on the account to prevent it from 'going to the State.""' The court
determined that if a mistake was made, whether it was a mistake of
law or fact, the presumption of the deposit contract and the West Vir-
ginia Banking Statute that ownership rights were transferred and that
survivorship existed would be rebutted. The court upheld the lower
court's determination that it was an issue for the jury whether the
depositor "intended a gift" or evidence of "'fraud, mistake or equally
serious fault"' existed to "rebut the presumption of a gift." 6 The bank
was not a party to the case and while the facts do not specifically
53. Webb v. Williams, 422 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1992).
54. Id. at 486.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 489.
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state, the assumption is that the bank had not yet paid the account
balance to anyone. If, however, the bank had paid the account balance
and had failed to initially warn the father as to the significance of his
actions when his actual intent had been expressed, a basis for liability
might have existed.
For this reason, it is incumbent upon the bank to ascertain the
intent of a depositor to an account on which two parties are named.
Does he or she intend to create a joint tenancy or, more pragmatically,
does he or she intend to jointly share ownership and entitlement? If so,
the West Virginia Banking Statute provides that the requirements for a
joint tenancy are met and the entitlement, or rather, the right of survi-
vorship will naturally follow. In fact, a checklist for the depositors
might be prepared asking the basic questions: (i) Do you each intend
that the other have a one-half interest in the account balance no matter
who makes the deposit and no matter the source of the funds?; (ii) Do
you each intend that the other can make a withdrawal from, or write a
check upon, this account for the full balance of the account without
the other's signature or approval?; and (iii) Do you each intend that
the other be entitled to the full balance of the account upon your
death? If these questions are answered affirmatively, then a joint tenan-
cy is intended to be created and the West Virginia Banking Statute
will have application. 7
If the intent of the depositors is not to have complete unity of
ownership, control and entitlement, then the bank must determine if it
can accommodate the customer's or or customers' intended use of the
account and, if so, how it can properly document the accommodation.
E. Other Aspects of the .Joint Tenancy Account
An interest in a Joint Tenancy Account is a property interest
which can be used to satisfy the claims of creditors of a tenant. The
57. If the deposit contract conforms with this expressed intent, then the West Virginia
Banking Statute will give rise to the conclusive presumption that a gift and a right of sur-
vivorship was intended. Customers may yet make the claim that they did not intend such a
gift. In the face of such claims, the bank can invoke the statutory 'presumption, bolstered by
the parties' own affirmation of their intent in response to the checklist.
1995]
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effect of a levy or execution against property held by a joint tenancy
is the destruction of some of the unities of the joint tenancy, reverting
the joint tenancy to a tenancy in common and thereby abrogating the
right of survivorship. A creditor will petition the court for a partition
of the judgment debtor's interest and the remaining tenants' inter-
ests.5s
For some individuals, this right of a creditor works a hardship. A
person deposits funds into a joint account, only to find that the amount
deposited is suggested by a creditor in satisfaction of a debt owed by
the other party named on the account. This also puts the bank in a
difficult situation administratively, for the bank must determine what
amount of the account balance to pay a creditor of only one of the
joint tenants.
The Legislature has provided, however, that:
A banking institution may pay the entire amount of a deposit account
created pursuant to this section to a creditor or other claimant of any of
the joint tenants in response to legal process employed by the creditor
including, but not limited to, garnishment, suggestion, or execution, regard-
less of any notice received from any of the joint tenants. Upon such pay-
ment, the banking institution shall be released and discharged from all
payments on account of such deposit. 9
This provision permitting the bank's payment of the entire account bal-
ance to a levying creditor is obviously for the ease of the bank's ad-
58. See, e.g., Harris v. Crowder, 322 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va. 1984) ("In the ordi-
nary course of events, the judgment creditor of one joint tenant can, under [W. VA. CODE
§] 38-3-9 [1923], cause the sale of that joint tenant's interest. The purchaser at such a sale
would then be a cotenant with the remaining cotenants in the property. Under our partition
statute, [W. VA. CODE §] 37-4-1 [1936], the purchaser at the judgment lien sale, after be-
coming an owner of an interest in the property, could, by meeting the requirements of the
statute and showing the reasonableness of the sale, partition the property."). Of course, the
property interest of a tenant in a joint deposit account against which action can be taken is
the bank's obligation to pay the account balance. The suggestion process would be used and,
presumably, the payment of one-half of the amount to the creditor would be easily done in
conformance with the court's order. See W. VA. CODE §§ 38-5-10 et seq. (1993). It is most
likely, however, that the creditor will be confronted with issues regarding the ownership of
the funds, similar to the issues raised in Lett and Dorsey.
59. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(f) (Supp. 1994).
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ministration,6" as ownership interests are presumably held by all the
joint tenants and the creditor is not entitled to the interest of the owner
who is not the judgment debtor. The fact that more than the judgment
debtor's interest can be affected was recognized by the Legislature
which stipulated that, notwithstanding the bank's payment to the credi-
tor of the entire balance of the account, "payment by a banking institu-
tion to any such creditor shall be without prejudice to any right or
claim of any joint tenant against the creditor or any other person to
recover his interest in the deposit.
'" 61
The potential hardship to a joint tenant is obvious. However, a
bank is obligated as follows:
[W]hen any joint deposit account is opened on or after the first day of
July, one thousand nine hundred ninety-four, the owners thereof shall be
given written notice either on a signature card or in connection with the
execution of a signature card, on a form to be approved by the banking
commissioner, that the entire balance of any such account may be paid to
a creditor or other claimant of any one of the joint tenants pursuant to
legal process, including, but not limited to, garnishment, suggestion, or
execution, regardless of the receipt of any notice from any of the joint
tenants.62
When so advised, prospective joint tenants may reevaluate the opening
of a joint deposit account.
The right of the non-debtor owner of the account with respect to
the creditor of the debtor owner is, in itself, an interesting issue. Obvi-
ously, the non-debtor owner will claim ownership of either one-half of
the account balance if the non-debtor owner was not the person mak-
ing the deposits or of the entire amount if he or she was making the
deposits. The first issue between the parties, therefore, is who made the
actual deposits and in what amount? Assuming that the evidentiary hur-
dles to establishing this fact can be cleared, the second issue becomes,
did one owner intend to convey a one-half interest in the deposit to
60. Indeed, the author of this article, in his capacity as in-house counsel for a bank
holding company, proposed the amendment due to the almost daily questions arising from
creditors' actions against only one owner of a joint account
61. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(f) (Supp. 1994).
62. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(d) (Supp. 1994).
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the other owner? Of course, the deposit contract presumptively answers
the question as yes. But if the deposit is a transfer effectively consti-
tuting a gift, can the gift be revoked? The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia has recognized that:
Decisions holding that there may be conditions placed on joint bank ac-
counts wherein the donor depositor retains control or ownership during his
lifetime are consistent with this Court's language in [an earlier case]. This
Court there indicated there may be some reason for holding no intent to
create an unqualified joint inter vivos property right in the joint bank ac-
count.6
But if it is truly a joint tenancy account, no conditions on ownership
will exist. Restated, the transfer of an ownership interest will be un-
qualified and, therefore, the gift, if any, of the funds placed on deposit
will not be revocable.
If the non-debtor owner deposited the funds, he or she will claim
that no unqualified gift to the debtor was intended and, therefore, the
creditor cannot proceed against any balance in the account. If the non-
debtor owner did not deposit the funds, he or she will claim that an
unqualified gift to him or her was intended by the debtor and the
creditor cannot proceed against the non-debtor owner's one-half of the
account balance.
As in the discussion regarding the respective interest of the various
parties named on a joint deposit account, the focus of this discussion
on creditors' rights is also necessarily on the issue of intent. The intent
of the depositor is first presumed from the manner of the deposit and,
therefore, the presumption is that each tenant has an undivided one-half
interest in the account balance. The affected depositor or creditor can
then attempt to rebut the presumption, offering evidence of the
depositor's actual intent in opening and using the joint deposit account.
63. Dorsey, 205 S.E.2d at 691 (emphasis added). If a condition is placed on the right
of ownership of the funds, then a "joint tenancy account" is not created. In fact, the
depositor's intent may be to give an "entitlement' upon the depositor's death or at a spe-
cific time instead of the right of ownership. A type of account that more appropriately hon-
ors this intent will be discussed later in this Article.
[Vol. 97:287
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Creditors often emphasize the fact that the owner of the account
who is the debtor could have conceivably withdrawn the entire balance
of the account and deposited the money into a sole account. For this
reason, the creditor should be entitled to the entire balance of the ac-
count notwithstanding the objections of the remaining parties to the
account. This position improperly mixes the concepts of "ownership"
and "control." The ability of one of the joint tenants to make a with-
drawal or write a check goes to control. The fact that this ability dis-
charges completely the bank's liability to both tenants is a protection
solely of the bank and is not intended to be determinative of who
actually owns the right to the bank's payment. Both tenants have the
right to payment, but each also has the right to demand or order the
bank's payment of the entire account balance. Indeed, since each joint
owner has the right of control, creditors for each owner could claim
that the entire balance of the account is available to satisfy each
owner's obligations and that it is merely who wins the race to the
courthouse that determines who gets paid. This result is untenable and
demonstrates the fallacy of the creditors' arguments.64
Another aspect of ownership is the ability to offer a property in-
terest to a creditor as security for the payment of an obligation. As the
ownership interest of a tenant in a Joint Tenancy Account is an undi-
vided one-half interest in the account balance, the immediate reaction
is that only the one-half interest of the depositor can be effectively
pledged to secure the repayment of that depositor's obligation to the
bank. However, from the bank's perspective, one-half of an account
cannot be effectively frozen. Administratively, it is an impossible task.
64. The bank's right of set off with respect to joint accounts is affected by the joint
tenancy. Set off requires a "mutuality of matured indebtedness," see Southern Elec. Supply
Co., 320 S.E.2d at 519, and with two depositors, but only one debtor, the mutuality is not
complete. Arguably, the analysis for the bank's right should not differ from the discussion
with respect to the depositor's other creditors. This means that the bank should presumptive-
ly be entitled to one-half of the account balance subject to rebuttal by both the bank and
the affected depositor of this presumption. The West Virginia Banking Statute does not ad-
dress the issue of set off. However, the statute does address the pledge of an account See
discussion infra. Therefore, banks may consider simply taking a security interest, as a matter
of course, in any joint account it opens for any obligation of each depositor presently owing
to the bank. In this fashion, the bank will have the benefit of the West Virginia Banking
Statute's favorable treatment of the pledge of joint accounts. See discussion infra.
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Moreover, the bank's further understandable presumption is that per-
sons who maintain a Joint Tenancy Account have a basic identity of
interest. Accordingly, banks have willingly accepted one tenant's pledge
of an entire account balance as security for an obligation of only that
tenant.
The author was involved in several disputes over this facet of the
Joint Tenancy Account and assisted in the drafting and advocacy of a
statutory provision that would preserve the banks' historical course of
conduct. In 1993, the Legislature provided that:
[I]f a pledge or encumbrance of any joint account created pursuant to this
section is made to a banking institution and the banking institution has not
received, prior to the date of the pledge, any written notice signed by any
one of the joint tenants prohibiting such a pledge or encumbrance, the
banking institution shall not be liable to any one of the joint tenants for
its recourse against the deposit in accordance with the terms of the
pledge.65
The reconciliation of this provision with traditional ownership concepts
is simply impossible. As established in the discussion about the rights
of creditors, the ability to "control," or the ability to order the payment
by the bank of the entire amount of the account balance, does not
provide the necessary ownership interest for purposes of execution or
levy.
A possible rationale for the ability of a joint tenant to pledge the
entire account balance and not just one-half of the balance is that the
pledge by one of the joint tenants presumably benefits, directly or
indirectly, both tenants and, therefore, one tenant should be able to
bind the other tenant under the control facet of the account. This sup-
ports a "presumption," however, and the statute provides an "absolute"
right to accept one tenant's pledge.
The only rationale, therefore, is that the ease of the bank's admin-
istration prevails in the balancing of the bank's interests with the inter-
ests of the non-pledging account owner. The harshness of this provi-
65. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(e) (Supp. 1994).
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sion has been somewhat lessened by the Legislature by requiring that a
banking institution give notice:
[Oin a form to be approved by the banking commissioner, that the "entire
balance of any such account may be... pledged as security to a banking
institution by any of the named joint tenants; or otherwise encumbered at
the request of any of the named joint tenants unless written notice is giv-
en to the banking institution, signed by any one of the joint tenants, not
to permit such payment, pledge or encumbrance."66
Significantly, "the giving of the notice required by this section to any
of the joint deposit account owners shall be deemed effective notice to
all owners of the joint deposit account."' 7
In short, individuals who are named on joint accounts must seri-
ously reexamine their intent and must determine that their intent is to
create a true joint tenancy account, with the attributes of ownership,
control and entitlement accruing to each joint tenant such that one
tenant may subject every tenant's interests to claims of that tenant's
creditors.
III. VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF OWNERSHIP, CONTROL
AND ENTITLEMENT: OTHER FoRMs OF JOINT ACCOUNTS
A. Tenancy in Common Accounts: Joint Ownership, but Questions of
Control and Entitlement
As previously discussed, the Joint Tenancy Account means a coin-
cidence of ownership and entitlement in each of the parties to the
deposit contract. The West Virginia Banking Statute provides the addi-
tional element of control, in that it empowers each tenant to direct the
bank's payment of the entire account balance.
If the element of survivorship is removed, then the result is, effec-
tively, a tenancy in common." Each of the depositors has an equal
66. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(d) (Supp. 1994).
67. Id.
68. As Professor Brown noted, "[ilt is submitted that a joint tenancy without survi-
vorship is essentially the same as a tenancy in common." Brown, supra note 18, at 210.
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pro-rated interest, but upon the death of a depositor, the entitlement to
the interest of the deceased depositor is in the heirs of the depositor,
whether determined by will or the intestacy statutes.
In fact, the actions of a joint tenant can convert a joint tenancy
with a right of survivorship into a tenancy in common. As the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has decreed:
A joint tenant may convey his undivided interest in real property to a
third person. When one of two joint tenants conveys his undivided interest
to a third person the right of survivorship is destroyed. Such third party
and the remaining joint tenant hold the property as tenants in common.69
The principal effect of the absence of a right of survivorship is
that a necessary condition to the application of the West Virginia
Banking Statute is not met; that is, the deposit is not "in [a] form to
be paid to any one of such depositors, or the survivor or survivors of
them."70 For this reason, the bank would not be afforded, arguably,
the protection of the provision that payment to one depositor discharges
the liability to all the joint depositors. Accordingly, the bank would not
make a payment to any one tenant, but instead, to all the tenants joint-
ly. Of course, the contract for deposit might provide for the same pro-
tection as the statute, effectively making each of the tenants in com-
mon an agent for the other tenant upon whom the bank may rely un-
less and until the agency was revoked by a writing delivered to the
bank.
The bank's further dilemma is what to do when one of the tenants
dies. With a Joint Tenancy Account, the account balance immediately
is vested in the remaining tenants who then continue to claim owner-
ship, control and entitlement among themselves. However, the tenancy
in common account lacks the element of entitlement, and therefore, the
death of a tenant means that the heirs of the deceased depositor take
an ownership interest in the account. The bank is potentially in the
position of honoring the request of the surviving tenant during the
period of time after the death of the other tenant and before the bank
69. Herring, 300 S.E.2d at 629, Syl. Pt. 4.
70. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(b) (Supp. 1994).
[V/ol. 97:287
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss2/4
THE LAW GOVERNING JOINT DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
learns of the death. In this situation, the bank cannot rely any longer
upon the agency provision in a contract because the agency was neces-
sarily revoked upon the death of the principal.
Accordingly, the tenancy in common account hinders the ease of
administration of deposit accounts and banks may determine, as a mat-
ter of policy, not to operate such accounts or to close Joint Tenancy
Accounts which are converted into tenancy in common accounts by an
action of a tenant.7'
The banks which permit such a tenancy in common account at-
tempt to distinguish the account by using an "and" as a conjunction of
the names of the tenants rather than using the disjunctive "or." This
designation merely creates confusion in most instances because the
body of the deposit contract will, nonetheless, provide for the right of
survivorship and for the payment at the instructions of one tenant rath-
er than both.
In fact, this apparent or potential conflict between the body of the
deposit contract and the titling of the account gives rise to the ques-
tion: Which controls? In the case of the use of the designation "and"
as a variance from the usual designation "or," the compelling argument
is that both the bank and the customer intended to change the standard
terms and it is quite likely that the courts would determine the intent
of the parties from the variation without reference to the standard
terms of the contract.
Confronted with the use of the word "and" to join two owners of
an account, the court would seemingly be compelled to determine that
a "tenancy in common" has been created. This is because a tenancy in
common is presumed unless survivorship is expressly preserved. The
Legislature provided for the following means of rebutting the presump-
tion: "[w]hen the instrument of conveyance or ownership in any estate,
whether real estate or tangible or intangible personal property, links
multiple owners together with the disjunctive 'or,' such ownership shall
be held as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, unless expressly
stated otherwise."'72 Accordingly, the purposeful use of the word "and"
71. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
72. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-20(b) (1985).
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by the bank and customer and an owner's testimony that a "right of
survivorship" was not intended to be created would be particularly
compelling evidence for a court or trier of fact.
As a note, banks also create joint accounts and use the designation
"or" with the additional language "with right of survivorship." The
additional language is unnecessary for two reasons. One, the use of the
disjunctive "or" creates the presumption of a right of survivorship.
Two, the contract itself provides, typically, for the right of survivor-
ship.
If a bank uses an "and" in its joinder of the owners of the account
and the contract of deposit does not speak to the manner in which
interests in the account will pass upon the death of an owner, then the
designation of "with right of survivorship" with the conjunction "and"
would seemingly create a right of survivorship. The "and" still effec-
tively creates a joint tenancy, and while the immediate presumption is
that a tenancy in common is intended, the purposeful use of the addi-
tional description falls squarely within the statutory provision that sur-
vivorship is preserved "when it manifestly appears from the tenor of
the instrument that it was intended that the part of the one dying
should then belong to the others."73
Essentially, to create a true tenancy in common account with no
uncertainty as to intent, the bank and depositor should first execute an
account agreement which is consistent with the attributes of the tenan-
cy in common and which expressly addresses the issue of control be-
cause the West Virginia Banking Statute, as discussed, does not gov-
ern. However, if owners truly desire a joint account that requires both
parties to act in concert and contains no entitlement or right of sur-
vivorship, then the most sensible step for the parties is to partition
their interests, which can easily be done with money or its equivalent,
and thereafter maintain separate accounts. No purpose is seemingly
served by such a cumbersome joining of interests.
73. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-20(a) (1985).
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B. Accounts with Minors: Questions of Ownership and Control
The Legislature has provided statutory guidance on the ability of
minors to contract. Specifically:
[N]o person who is eighteen years of age or older shall lack legal capaci-
ty, by reason of his age, to enter into contracts, sell or purchase real or
personal property, create a lien, execute any legal or other written instru-
ment, prosecute or defend legal actions, assert claims or deal in his own
affairs in any manner whatsoever.74
The necessary application of this statute is that a person who is not yet
eighteen generally lacks a legal capacity to contract.
With respect to banking transactions, however, the following pro-
vision has applicability:
Whenever any minor shall make, or have credit for, a deposit in any
banking institution, in his or her name, the money so deposited may be
paid out on the check or order of such depositor the same as in case of a
depositor of legal age, and such payment shall be in all respects valid, ex-
cept when such banking institution has been specifically directed in writing
by the parent or guardian of such minor not to make such payment.75
An immediate observation is that the Legislature has determined that,
again, a bank's ease in administering such accounts is more important
than maintaining the general proposition that a minor cannot sufficient-
ly form the necessary capacity to contract.
The statute provides that, if a minor has the ownership interest in
the account, then the minor automatically has the control over she
account notwithstanding that the depositor is not of legal age. Howev-
er, the parent or guardian of the minor can remove the minor's control
over the account by delivery of a notice to the bank. The presumption
is then that the minor may have ownership of the account, but the
74. W. VA. CODE § 2-3-1 (1994).
75. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-34 (1988). This provision shall be referred to in this Arti-
cle as the "Minor's Control Provision."
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parent or guardian has the control, as is the constant bane of many
adolescents' existence.
The author's experience is, however, that many parents or guard-
ians use a joint account in the name of the "minor" "or" the "parent"
to reflect, in the parents' minds, the minor's ownership of the account,
but to maintain the parent's guardianship, or rather, control over the
account. The problem is, of course, that the standard form of contract
sets forth, and the West Virginia Banking Statute conclusively pre-
sumes, that a joint account is a joint tenancy with attributes of joint
ownership, joint entitlement, and joint control, which is absolutely
inconsistent with the parent's or guardian's intent. Again, the parent
intends ownership to be solely in the minor, but control to be solely in
the parent or perhaps the parent and the minor jointly.
Banks must determine if a minor's account is to be offered to
customers. The establishment of such accounts is fraught with prob-
lems. For larger institutions, notice to the bank from the parent may be
delayed or lost while the instructions of the minor may be automat-
ically processed. Or generally, the parents may not be aware that the
minor has control of the account under the provisions of state law and
the minor may very well expend the funds from the account in a man-
ner of which the parent or guardian is disapproving. The most likely
result is the parent's or guardian's frustrated exclamation to the bank
of "how could you let him or her do that" or the lawyer's similar dra-
matic exultation before a jury.
If a bank is to offer such accounts, then the bank must determine
how it will title the accounts so that the issues of control and owner-
ship are readily ascertainable by the representatives of the bank who
will transact the business of the bank with respect to the account.
Moreover, the bank must determine if it is the parent's or guardian's
intent to permit the minor to control the bank's repayment of the obli-
gation to the minor.
The title to the account should obviously reflect that ownership is
in a minor and then should further set forth the name of the parent or
guardian of the minor who will provide the oversight of, or will accept
the parental or custodial responsibility for, the minor's account. Ac-
cordingly, the bank may establish the account as "A, a minor, by B,
[Vol. 97:287
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parent or guardian." This form of the title reflects that ownership is in
"A." The issue of control is not yet fully addressed, however. The
bank should immediately upon opening the account determine whether
the parent will permit the minor's control of the account. In fact, the
advice of the author has been to include in the title line for the ac-
count, if the fields in the baik's electronic system will permit such an
entry, a box that describes that "if checked, the parent/guardian in-
structs bank not to honor any request of the minor for payment of the
account." If not checked, then the minor will have control; however,
this is not sole control, but joint control because the parent or guard-
ian, by reason of their capacity, retain control over the account as
well.76 The bank should also establish in the contract a provision for
the parent's or guardian's acknowledgement regarding the form and
manner of the notice which the parent may send if the minor's control
of the account is to be revoked. Again, the notice should be directed
to the attention of someone who can automatically enter the instruc-
tions into the bank's processing system and establish that no unreason-
able time lapsed between the bank's receipt of the notice and the
bank's action upon the notice.
Another issue arises with respect to these accounts: What happens
when the minor reaches the age of majority? The capacity of the par-
ent or guardian depends, presumably, upon the mere age of the charge.
This capacity changes when the minor reaches the age of majority and,
therefore, ownership and control merge solely in the newly matured
76. If the bank desires to reduce all risk with respect to the account, the bank should,
of course, confirm in some manner that the capacity of the adults on the account is correct;
that is, the parent is a parent or the guardian is a guardian. The bank may decide, however,
that the risk that a person would misrepresent their capacity is less than the customer's
inconvenience and dissatisfaction that may arise from such a challenge.
Moreover, another issue which is raised is whether a parent, other than the parent
on the account, or another guardian can assert control over the account even though they
are not listed on the account. Legally, the answer is yes for their capacity is to exercise
judgment for the minor assuming that such parental responsibility has not been severed by a
custody order or other process. The bank must make a difficult choice in such a matter,
that is, to ignore the legal capacity of the non-listed parent or guardian or to potentially
face the wrath of the listed parent or guardian. The better exercise is to list in the title to
the account all parents and guardians and to refuse an account if one parent, without a
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account owner. The bank must make some provision, therefore, for
changing the account title when the minor reaches eighteen so that the
parent or guardian is no longer reflected as having control over the
account. Again, an administrative issue arises and the bank must deter-
mine if it will offer such an account.
The parent or guardian should reflect upon the reasons for not
permitting the minor's control over the account. If the funds deposited
with the bank for credit to the minor's ownership represents a gift to
the minor for use when the minor reaches a certain age, perhaps for
college or to buy the necessary means of transportation from home to
the store on Saturday nights, then other statutorily-contemplated ac-
count arrangements do exist.
In 1986, the Legislature enacted the "Uniform Transfers to Minors
Act."" The statute's title belies its true purpose in that it does not
govern transfers to minors, but, instead, governs transfers to custodians
on behalf of minors. The statute generally provides that: (i) a person
who has the "right to designate the recipient of property transferable
upon the occurrence of a future event may revocably nominate a cus-
todian to receive the property for a minor beneficiary upon the occur-
rence of the event;" '78 (ii) "[a] person may make a transfer by irrevo-
cable gift to, or the irrevocable exercise of a power of appointment in
favor of, a custodian for the benefit of a minor;" '79 (iii) "a personal
representative or trustee may make an irrevocable transfer . . . to a
custodian for the benefit of a minor as authorized in the governing will
or trust;"8 (iv) "a personal representative or trustee may make an ir-
revocable transfer to another adult or trust company as custodian for
the benefit of a minor . . . in the absence of a will or under a will or
trust that does not contain an authorization to do so;"'" (v) "a conser-
77. Acts of the Legislature of West Virginia 1986, c. 169.
78. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-3(a) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). The revocable nature of
this right is merely a recognition that the person having the power of designation can
change his or her mind until the condition to the transfer of the property is satisfied and
"the nominating instrument becomes irrevocable." W. VA. CODE § 36-7-3(c) (Supp. 1994).
79. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-4 (Supp. 1994).
80. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-5(a) (Supp. 1994).
81. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-6(a) (Supp. 1994). The personal representative or trustee
may make such a transfer only if "the personal representative [and] trustee . . . considers
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vator may make an irrevocable transfer to another adult or trust com-
pany as custodian for the benefit of the minor;" 2 or (vi) "a per-
son who holds property of or owes a liquidated debt to a mi-
nor ... may make an irrevocable transfer to a custodian for the bene-
fit of the minor.' ' 3 The property which may be so transferred to a
custodian for the benefit of a minor includes an "uncertificated securi-
ty,')84 a "certificated security," 5 a "life or endowment insurance poli-
cy or annuity contract,"86 an "irrevocable exercise of a power of ap-
pointment or an irrevocable present right to future payment under a
contract, ' 87 an "interest in real property,"" a "certificate of title is-
sued by a department or agency of a state or of the United States
which evidences title to tangible personal property," 89 and, most rele-
vant to this article, "money ...paid or delivered to a broker or finan-
cial institution for credit to an account."9 Essentially, the statute con-
templates a gift to a minor by a transfer that, in most instances, is to
be irrevocable, but for which delivery is made to a custodian. This gift
can be the deposit of monies to which ownership will be in the minor,
but control will be in the custodian.
The effect of a transfer in this manner is described, thusly:
A transfer made pursuant to ... [the operable provisions of the act] is
irrevocable, and the custodial property is indefeasibly vested in the minor,
but the custodian has all the rights, powers, duties and authority provided
the transfer to be in the best interest of the minor, (ii) the transfer is not prohibited by or
inconsistent with provisions of the applicable will, trust agreement or other governing instru-
ment and (iii) the transfer is authorized by the court if it exceeds ten thousand dollars in
value." W. VA. CODE § 36-7-6(c) (Supp. 1994).
82. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-6(b) (Supp. 1994). The custodian may make such a transfer
only if "the . . .conservator . . . considers the transfer to be in the best interest of the
minor; (ii) the transfer is not prohibited by or inconsistent with provisions of the applicable
will, trust agreement or other governing instrument and (iii) the transfer is authorized by the
court if it exceeds ten thousand dollars in value." W. VA. CODE § 36-7-6(c) (Supp. 1994).
83. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-7(a) (Supp. 1994).
84. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-9(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
85. Id.
86. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-9(a)(3) (Supp. 1994).
87. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-9(a)(4) (Supp. 1994).
88. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-9(a)(5) (Supp. 1994).
89. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-9(a)(6) (Supp. 1994).
90. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-9(a)(2) (Supp. 1994).
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in this . . . [act] and neither the minor nor the minor's legal representative
has any right, power, duty or authority with respect to the custodial prop-
erty [i.e., the deposit account] except as provided in this article.9
The custodian's power and authority over the property is described
broadly. Specifically, "[a] custodian, acting in a custodial capacity, has
all the rights, powers and authority over custodial property that unmar-
ried adult owners have over their own property, but a custodian may
exercise those rights, powers and authority in that capacity only.
92
The statute defines a minor as "an individual who has not attained
the age of twenty-one years" 93 and therefore, "[t]he custodian shall
transfer in an appropriate manner the custodial property to the minor
or to the minor's estate upon the earlier of: (1) the minor's attainment
of twenty-one years of age . . . or (3) [t]he minor's death."94 Again,
in terms of the author's vernacular, the minor has sole ownership, but
the custodian has control until the minor's death or until the minor
attains the age of twenty-one years.
The bank must establish such an account consistent with the
minor's ownership and the custodian's control. Significantly, the form
of the transfer of funds to a deposit account is expressly mandated in
the West Virginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, in that the transfer
91. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-11(b) (Supp. 1994).
92. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-13(a) (Supp. 1994). Strictures on the custodian's care of
property are expressly set forth, including the requirements that the custodian "shall observe
the standard of care that would be observed by a prudent person dealing with property of
another," "shall keep custodial property separate and distinct from all other property in a
manner sufficient to identify it clearly as custodial property of the minor," and "shall keep
records of all transactions with respect to custodial property . . . and shall make them avail-
able for inspection at reasonable intervals by a parent or legal representative of the minor or
by the minor if the minor has attained the age of fourteen years." W. VA. CODE § 36-7-12
(Supp. 1994).
93. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-1(11) (Supp. 1994). The "West Virginia Uniform Transfers
to Minors Act," W. VA. CODE § 36-7-24 (Supp. 1994), effectively repealed the provisions
of the "West Virginia Uniform Gifts to Minors Act." Acts of the Legislature of West Vir-
ginia 1957, c. 86. A significant difference between the two acts is that the existing act
raised the age of the minor from eighteen to twenty-one. Another difference was that addi-
tional property was expressly added to the existing act as eligible for transfer to a custodian
for the benefit of a minor.
94. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-20 (Supp. 1994).
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is to be delivered to the financial institution for credit to an account
"in the name of the transferor95 or an adult other than the transferor
or a trust company, followed in substance by the words: 'As custodian
for ...(name of minor) under the West Virginia Uniform Transfers to
Minors Act."' 96 Moreover, such an account may be made "only for
one minor, and only one person may be the custodian."97 For all oth-
er purposes, however, the deposit account may be maintained by the
bank as any other deposit account. Indeed, the statute expressly dictates
that:
A third person in good faith and without court order may act on the in-
structions of or otherwise deal with any person purporting to make a
transfer or purporting to act in the capacity of a custodian and, in the
absence of knowledge, is not responsible for determining: (1) The validity
of the purported custodian's designation; (2) The propriety of, or the au-
thority under . . . [the act] for, any act of the purported custodian; (3)
The validity or propriety under ... [the act] of any instrument or instruc-
tions executed or given either by the person purporting to make a transfer
or by the purported custodian; or (4) The propriety of the application of
any property of the minor delivered to the purported custodian."
Accordingly, the bank should not be troubled by the offering and ad-
ministering of this particular account and the parents of the minor
should be comforted by the control which is retained over the minor's
use of the funds that were deposited into the account.
The control of the account by the custodian does raise interesting
questions for the bank. What if the custodian pledges the account for
an obligation of the custodian to the bank? The above-quoted provi-
sions suggest that the bank is not responsible for "determining" the
"propriety of the application of any property of the minor delivered to
the purported custodian."99 A bank might argue that it could indis-
criminately accept the pledge of the account for the custodian's obliga-
tion. However, the provision provides that the bank must be without
95. This clarifies that a parent making a gift to a child can act as the child's custodi-
an for the purpose of controlling the deposit account.
96. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-9(a)(2) (Supp. 1994).
97. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-10 (Supp. 1994).
98. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-16 (Supp. 1994).
99. Id.
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"knowledge" of the impropriety of the act. The bank is aware of the
custodian's capacity and, therefore, arguably has knowledge that the
custodian's use of the account for his or her own personal obligation is
improper. However, the custodian is empowered to:
[E]xpend for the minor's benefit so much of the custodial property as the
custodian considers advisable for the use and benefit of the minor, without
court order and without regard to (i) the duty or ability of the custodian
personally or of any other person to support the minor, or (ii) any other
income or property of the minor which may be applicable or available for
that purpose."°
Accordingly, the bank is in a position to accept a pledge of the ac-
count if the loan which it secures is for the ultimate benefit of the
minor. The bank should require written acknowledgment from the
custodian that it is, indeed, for the benefit of the minor.
The parent or other person making such a gift to a minor must be
aware of its irrevocable nature. Accordingly, a parent or guardian of a
minor who wants to retain effective ownership of the funds, through
the power of revocation of the gift, should not use an account which
indicates that it constituted a transfer to a custodian for the benefit of
the minor. Perhaps the parent or guardian would rather expressly retain
ownership and control of a deposit account and merely give the minor
an entitlement. This type of account will be discussed in the following
section.
C. Payable on Death and In Trust for Accounts: Sole Ownership and
Control in One Party and Entitlement in Another
For many individuals, the automatic transfer to another person of
the right to receive payment from a bank upon their death is a desir-
able feature. The account does not require probate and the beneficiary
has immediate use of the funds upon the death of the depositor. As
discussed earlier, such an account has often been described as the
"poor man's will."'1°
100. W. VA. CODE § 36-7-14(a) (Supp. 1994).
101. See supra note 1.
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The Legislature has provided for such an automatic transfer in,
ironically, two different, yet very similar, ways. First:
If any deposit in any banking institution be made by any person describ-
ing him or herself in making such deposit as trustee for another, and no
other or further notice of the existence and terms of a legal and valid trust
than such description shall be given in writing to the banking institution,
in the event of the death of the person so described as trustee, such de-
posit, or any part thereof, together with the interest thereon, may be paid
to the person for whom the deposit was thus stated to have been
made.1
02
These accounts have variously been described as "in trust for" ac-
counts. The distinguishing characteristic of the account is that the de-
posit is made "as trustee for another." To make a deposit in such a
form requires that the contract reflect the depositor's intent. The title to
the account is the most convenient aspect of the account in which to
reflect such intent and could be stated as "A in trust for B."
A second distinguishing feature of the account is that the bank
does not have knowledge of an actual trust agreement. This feature
goes to the issue of ownership. If an actual trust exists, then the trust-
ee has legal title, but the ownership interest more truly lies with the
beneficiary. The "in trust for" account provision seemingly contem-
plates that ownership of the account resides with the depositor until the
death of the depositor and no fiduciary obligation exists on the part of
the depositor to the beneficiary. Restated, the depositor retains owner-
ship and control of the deposit account, but has given an entitlement to
another person.
The bank need not be concerned with the depositor's use of the
money. An act of the depositor repugnant to the person for whom the
account is "in trust for" can be treated by the bank as merely reflec-
tive of the depositor's ownership or as evidence of the depositor's
intent to revoke the future gift. Again, the depositor has the ownership
and the control while the entitlement, albeit potentially attenuated, is
given to the other person.
102. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(a) (Supp. 1994).
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This "in trust for" statutory provision is seemingly obscure. The
author's experience was that only a few small community banks of-
fered such accounts. The obscurity of this provision may be the reason
that the Legislature created the "payable on death" account which, in
terms of the attributes of ownership, control and entitlement, is identi-
cal to the "in trust for" account, but the statutory provisions for the
"payable on death" account do not repeal, or make any reference to,
the "in trust for" provisions.
Specifically, the Legislature provided:
Any person may enter into a written contract with any banking institution
located in this state to establish a payable on death bank account, which
may be abbreviated as a "p.o.d." account. A payable on death account
contract shall provide that upon the death of the account owner the bal-
ance of any such account shall be paid to the beneficiary or beneficiaries
specifically designated by the owner of the account who are surviving at
the time of the owner's death.10 3
While the "in trust for" provisions only specifically address the issue
of entitlement upon the death of the depositor, the "payable on death"
provisions specifically discuss the issues of ownership and control.
With respect to ownership, the "payable on death" statute provides
that "[t]he owner of a payable on death account shall maintain all
right, title and interest in the banking account, including principal and
interest, during his or her lifetime."'0 4 Two other provisions make
certain that the person receiving an entitlement has no ownership or
control. The first provision states "[t]he account owner may change the
designated beneficiary at any time."'0 5 The second provision empha-
sizes that "[d]esignated beneficiaries have no rights or claims to a pay-
able on death account until the death of the last surviving owner of
such account."'0°
103. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33a(a) (Supp. 1994).
104. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33a(b) (Supp. 1994).
105. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33a(c) (Supp. 1994). This statute further provides that, to
change a beneficiary, "[s]uch change must be in writing and executed in the form and man-
ner prescribed by the bank. Any such change of beneficiary must be delivered to the bank
prior to the death of the payable on death account owner in order to be valid." Id.
106. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33a(d) (Supp. 1994). Pursuant to the provisions of W. VA.
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Interestingly, the statute contemplates the possibility of a joint
ownership in the account. However, the designated beneficiary is not
entitled to payment from the bank until both of the joint owners die.
Accordingly, if an account is opened as a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship, the right of survivorship still remains in a surviving ten-
ant notwithstanding the instructions about the payment upon death to
the designated beneficiary. Moreover, the statute contemplates the pos-
sibility of joint beneficiaries and "[u]nless otherwise provided in the
written contract, where two or more beneficiaries are designated, upon
the death of the account owner, each surviving beneficiary shall be
paid a per capita share of the account balance."'0 7
The statute further provides direction and protection to the bank by
stipulating that "[u]pon the death of the last surviving account owner,
delivery of moneys in a payable on death account to the designated
beneficiary or beneficiaries pursuant to the terms of the written con-
tract shall fully and completely discharge the banking institution of all
obligations under said contract."'
08
From the bank's perspective, the "in trust for" and "payable on
death" accounts are identical in terms of ownership, control and enti-
tlement. However, the "payable on death" provisions are more explicit
about the nature of such an account and the respective obligations and
rights of the depositor, the bank, and the beneficiary. Accordingly, no
reason can be given for offering the "in trust for" account as an alter-
native to, or in lieu of, the "payable on death" account.
One requirement of the "payable on death" provisions should be
noted. The statute sets forth a condition that "a payable on death ac-
count contract shall provide that upon the death of the account owner
the balance of any such account shall be paid to the beneficiary or
CODE § 31A-4-33a(e) (Supp. 1994), if the "designated beneficiary is a minor at the time he
or she becomes vested with any part of a payable on death account, that portion of the
account shall be paid to the minor beneficiary in accordance with the provisions of the
[Minor's Control Provision]." For an explanation of the Minor's Control Provision, see supra
note 75 and accompanying text
107. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33a(d) (Supp. 1994). The statute further provides that "[i]f
no designated beneficiary survives the last account owner, any account balance shall become
a part of the last surviving account owner's estate." Id.
108. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33a(f) (Supp. 1994).
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beneficiaries specifically designated by the owner of the account."' °9
The account title should certainly reflect that it is a payable on death
account. As an example, "A, p.o.d. to B" or, as previously discussed,
"A or B,' p.o.d. to C (and/or D)."1 0 However, does this satisfy the
requirement that the deposit contract "provide" for this result? Argu-
ably, it does; however, two possible steps can be taken to remove the
uncertainty. One step is to provide in the contract that the account title
shall constitute part of the contract. However, a danger lurks in such a
provision. In the event of an inconsistency between the title and the
contractual provisions, the bank is bound by the argument that the
contract itself is ambiguous because the title is incorporated into the
contract and the rules of resolving ambiguity come in to play. There-
fore, the second step may be the wiser course, which is to include in
the deposit contract a provision that repeats the payable on death pro-
visions. One standard form of contract with which the author is famil-
iar contains the following language:
[I]f two or more of you create such an account [that is, a p.o.d. account],
you own the account jointly with survivorship. Beneficiaries acquire the
right to withdraw only if: (1) all persons creating the account die, and (2)
the beneficiary is then living. If two or more beneficiaries are named and
survive the death of all persons creating the account, such beneficiaries
will own this account in equal shares, without right of survivorship. The
person(s) creating this account type reserves the right to: (1) change bene-
ficiaries, (2) change account type, and (3) withdraw all or part of the
deposit at any time.
The title to the account will serve to identify the account as a "p.o.d.
account" and this clause, which fairly addresses all the points raised
with respect to such accounts, will satisfy the statutory requirement
regarding the necessary provisions that must be set forth in the deposit
contract.
109. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33a(a) (Supp. 1994).
110. The designation of the account as "p.o.d." is a permissible abbreviation under the
statute. Id. The designation of joint beneficiaries by the disjunctive "or" or the conjunctive
"and" should make no difference, for the governing statute makes certain that a beneficiary
who does not survive the depositor does not have an entitlement to the account upon the
death of the depositor.
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D. Depositors and Their Agents: Sole Ownership but with Control
Shared by, or Vested Solely in, a Party Other than the Owner
The intent of many joint depositors, as previously discussed, is not
that the parties have joint ownership, but that one named party be able
to assist the other party in the transaction of business with the bank.
This commonly arises with the elderly, who request or require the
assistance of family, friends or neighbors. Again, the intent is that one
person have ownership, but that both have control of the account.
Unfortunately, this intent may never be expressed to the bank or
the bank may not understand the import of the depositor's instructions
in establishing the account. Instead, the title reflects a joint account
with right of survivorship and the terms of the executed deposit con-
tract reflect joint attributes of ownership, control and entitlement.
For the bank to accurately reflect the depositor's intent, the bank
must title the account in the depositor's name and then merely reflect
the interest of the remaining party as that of control, but not of owner-
ship or entitlement. In effect, the person with whom the depositor
desires to share control is acting as an agent of the depositor. Two
remedies are available to the bank.
The first remedy is to require the presentation of a written agree-
ment between the depositor and the party with whom control is to be
shared. In fact, one readily available form of agreement is the power
of attorney."' The power of attorney has been defined as an "instru-
ment authorizing another to act as one's agent or attorney.""' A lim-
ited power could be given to the controlling party detailing the ability
of the party to act on behalf of the depositor with respect to the de-
posit account.
The responsibilities of the bank with respect to a power of attor-
ney have been variously defined by both case law and statute. In the
111. For the discussion of powers of attorney, the author is obligated to acknowledge
the substantive contributions of Merrell S. McIlwain, II, Esq., practicing in Charleston, W.
Va.
112. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1171 (6th ed. 1990).
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case of Milner v. Milner,"' the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia was confronted with a set of facts in which a bank had been
presented with a power of attorney that was improperly used for the
benefit of the person to whom the power was granted, typically re-
ferred to as an "attorney in fact." The court expressed, as a general
principal of law, that "when dealing with a broad power of attorney,
there is no obligation on a third party to go behind the power."
14
With respect to the facts of the case and the use of the power of attor-
ney to misappropriate a bank account, the court applied this principle
and then stated that the bank was to act "diligently . . . to make cer-
tain the document was authentic and legal.11. If, in the exercise of
such diligence, the bank did not discover "circumstances which might
place a reasonably prudent bank on notice that its fiduciary duty to its
accountholder demands additional inquiry," then the bank "may rely on
the terms of the power of attorney to discern the authority of the hold-
er of such power demanding a withdrawal of funds." '
The requirement that the document be authentic merely means that
the document is what it purports to be. For a power of attorney, this
translates into a requirement that the instrument grant the necessary
power and is actually signed by the person granting the power, typical-
ly referred to as the principal. If the signature of the principal is nota-
rized, then a presumption of authenticity exists."7 If the power of at-
torney is publicly recorded then, again, a presumption of authenticity
exists if the clerk of the county commission authenticates a copy of the
recorded instrument."' If, however, the power merely contains a sig-
nature, then the bank must in some fashion verify the signature either
by requiring the principal to verify the signature or by comparing the
signature with specimens that the bank may have on file.
The requirement that the bank determine the legality of the docu-
ment is problematic and, in fact, puzzling. Perhaps the court was refer-
113. Milner v. Milner, 395 S.E.2d 517 (W. Va. 1990).
114. Id. at 521.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See W. VA. R. EVIM. 902(8)
118. See W. VA. R. EVM. 902(4).
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ring to the competency of the principal when the power was granted,
but this seemingly puts the bank in a very difficult situation. Perhaps
the court was referring to the determination of whether the power of
attorney was terminated or revoked. Termination occurs upon the death
of the principal or as set forth in the instrument granting the power
and, therefore, the bank should not be unduly burdened in making this
determination. Revocation requires a further investigation about the
principal's intent and such an investigation may be difficult, for in
many instances the power is granted due to the principal's general
unavailability.
The burden of determining the legality of a power of attorney was
described by the Milner court, however, with respect to actions taken
under a power of attorney issued in 1979. In 1986, the Legislature
codified the "Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act,.. 9 which sig-
nificantly lessened this burden. Specifically:
As to acts undertaken in good faith reliance thereon, an affidavit executed
by the attorney in fact under a power of attorney, durable or otherwise,
stating that he did not have at the time of exercise of the power actual
knowledge of the termination of the power by revocation or of the
principal's death, disability or incapacity is conclusive proof of the
nonrevocation or nontermination of the power at that time.'
This affidavit of an attorney in fact answers many of the troublesome
questions about the legality of a power of attorney.
Moreover, if the power of attorney is a durable one, the bank need
not be concerned about the disability or incompetency of the principal.
The Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act provides:
A durable power of attorney is a power of attorney by which a principal
designates another his attorney in fact in writing and the writing contains
the words "This power of attorney shall not be affected by subsequent
disability or incapacity of the principal," or "This power of attorney shall
become effective upon the disability or incapacity of the principal," or
similar words showing the intent of the principal that the authority con-
119. W. VA. CODE §§ 39-4-1 et seq. (Supp. 1994).
120. W. VA. CODE § 39-4-5 (Supp. 1994).
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ferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the principal's subsequent dis-
ability or incapacity.'
The issues about the legality of a power of attorney are significantly
narrowed when a durable power of attorney is issued.
Even if "the affidavit of the attorney in fact is received or a dura-
ble power of attorney exists, the bank is still confronted with the issue
of legality arising from the principal's incapacity or disability when the
power of attorney was originally executed. The protection of third
parties who deal with powers of attorney that was expressly intended
by the Milner opinion is seriously undermined if the bank is required
to examine the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instru-
ment. The only consistent application of the Milner opinion is that the
bank has no duty to explore these circumstances until the bank has
knowledge of' circumstances that would put a "reasonably prudent bank
on notice" that the principal may have been incompetent when the in-
strument was originally executed. Examples of such circumstances
might include a statement by the principal's relative which raises the
possibility. Or potentially, the document may show a "signature which
is vague, wavering, and totally unlike the signature ... as known to
the banks from past transactions and their own records . . . [t]hat, in
itself, was enough to put the defendants on notice that due care re-
quired further investigation by them before parting with the depositor's
money.,'
22
A remaining issue regarding "legality" is whether the transaction is
within the scope of the power of attorney. This requirement translates
into a requirement that the bank read the instrument granting the power
of attorney. Generally, the powers are so broadly worded that no issue
will arise with respect to the power of the attorney to, in fact, control
the deposit account.
121
121. W. VA. CODE § 39-4-1 (Supp. 1994).
122. Beaucur v. Bristol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 268 A.2d 679, 687 (Conn. Cir. Ct.
1969).
123. One issue that might arise is a power of attorney that does not become effective
until the occurrence of a future event, such as a durable power of attorney that will become
effective only upon the disability or incompetency of the principal. If presented with such a
power of attorney, the bank would need to determine the actual incapacity or incompetency
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Accordingly, the bank is afforded broad protection regarding the
power of attorney, but the bank is not entirely relieved of certain bur-
dens. Intriguingly, a bank may not be able to refuse a power of attor-
ney simply for ease of its administration. A person has the inherent
right to delegate control of his or her affairs and the bank has no valid
reason not to fulfill its contractual obligation to the depositor pursuant
to the instructions of a duly designated agent unless, of course, the
deposit contract expressly states that no agency will be permitted.
The bank is confronted with other issues with respect to the power
of attorney. The power of attorney may be presented after the deposi-
tor opens the account or, in fact, may be used to open the account.
The principal is the owner of the account and the attorney in fact
merely has the power to control the account. However, the bank must
not ignore the fact that the principal also retains the right of control.
Restated, the principal does not relinquish control over his property
simply because he or she has executed a power of attorney.124 Ac-
cordingly, the bank is obligated under the contract to pay at the de-
mand of either the principal or the attorney in fact. Moreover, the
principal may notify the bank that the power of attorney has been
revoked and, thereafter, the bank may only allow the principal to con-
trol the account unless another power of attorney is executed.125 Be-
of the principal, probably by receipt of a medical opinion to that effect A variant on this
issue is one in which the power terminates upon the occurrence of a condition. However, an
affidavit of the attorney in fact that the condition has not occurred would seemingly fit
within the provisions of the Uniform Durable Power Act permitting the bank's reliance upon
an affidavit.
124. It should also be noted that entities who are authorized to act on behalf of a prin-
cipal, such as a committee, would be able to exercise his or her control over the deposit
account in addition to the attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney. Indeed, a
legal representative of the principal, responsible for management of all the principal's affairs,
could seemingly revoke the durable power of attorney on behalf of the principal.
125. One issue with which the author has struggled is: What if two powers of attorney
are in existence? A reasonable argument can be made that, if the instruments confer the
same powers on different people, the later instrument was intended to revoke the previous
instrument. If different powers exist then the principal could very well have intended to
have two attorneys in fact exercising their respective agencies. The only safe course is to
contact the principal and have the principal clarify if he or she intended to have multiple
attorneys in fact and whether the principal intended that they act jointly or separately. If
this clarification cannot be obtained, the bank is justified in either refusing to acknowledge
the earlier power of attorney, arguing that the later instrument was the more recent expres-
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cause the attorney in fact may be removed by the principal from the
account, the bank may not want to put the name of the attorney in fact
in the title to the account. Rather, the account name would solely be in
the principal's name, but the signature authority of the attorney in fact
would be reflected elsewhere, perhaps on the signature lines with the
capacity of the attorney in fact clearly set forth.
A second remedy to the problem of the control of accounts by an
agent is to enact a statute that permits "agency accounts." The statute
should require that the intent of the depositor to appoint an agent be
expressly stated in the title to the account such as "A by agent." The
statute would, similar to other statutory provisions previously discussed,
preserve the bank's ease in administering the account. The statute
might also require a notice in the deposit contract that explains the
ability of the agent to effectively control the account. Finally, the stat-
ute would clearly state the mechanism by which the agency could be
terminated requiring, for instance, a notice, in writing, to be delivered
to the bank.
IV. CONCLUSION: MELDING THE CUSTOMER'S INTENT INTO THE
BANK'S DOCUMENTATION
The previous discussion discloses that the term "joint deposit ac-
count" is improperly used to encompass many other intended ar-
rangements. The contract's title may reflect an intended joint owner-
ship, control and entitlement and the contract's provisions may support
this joint ownership, control and entitlement, yet the depositor may
unwittingly be maintaining an account in a form that does not serve
the depositor's intended purpose. How should a purported conflict
between the manner in which an account is established and the
depositor's intent be resolved?
In the 1974 Dorsey opinion, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia discussed its precedent that "in the absence of fraud,
mistake or some equally serious fault, . . . a conclusive presumption
that the donor depositor of a joint account intended the money remain-
sion of the principal's intent, or in demanding that both attorneys in fact act in concert.
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ing in the account after his death to belong to the surviving joint ten-
ant [is created].""2 6 And, in fact, the court in Dorsey remanded the
case for further development of the facts regarding the mother's con-
tention that she had not "intended" to make her daughter a joint tenant.
If the customer clearly expresses to the bank that only control is
to be established, yet the bank documents the creation of a joint tenan-
cy, then the Dorsey opinion could be applied to rebut the conclusive
presumption of a joint tenancy."'
Moreover, if the title purportedly reflects the intent of the deposi-
tor, but the contractual provisions are inconsistent, which should pre-
vail? As the general principle of contract law is to determine the
parties' intent, then seemingly a title which does this would control.
The deposit contract is the bank's standard form and it is most likely
that neither the customer or the bank's representative read the contract.
The solution to this problem is not legal argument; it is, instead,
risk prevention. First, the bank's management must determine what
deposit products the bank will offer and in what form. This list of
products should be generally available to customers so that no custom-
er can legitimately claim that the account which was intended to be
established is one that the bank has expressly documented will not be
offered.
Second, the bank should adequately train, and document the train-
ing of, its tellers or other customer service representatives about the
differing issues of ownership, control and entitlement. The tellers or
other representatives should be familiar with the provisions of the de-
posit contract and how the issues of ownership, control and entitlement
are described in the form of contract. Most importantly, the customer
service representatives must be able to articulate these issues intelligi-
bly to the customers.
Third, the bank must devise a mechanism by which the customer
can clearly articulate his or her intent in establishing the account and
the bank must be able to document the customer's expression of intent.
126. Dorsey, 205 S.E.2d at 690.
127. Admittedly, rebutting a "conclusive" presumption seems a legal oxymoron.
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The author recommends a questionnaire that would ask the customer in
logical fashion about the issues of ownership, entitlement or control.
An example might be a form which first asks whether the customer
wants to be the sole owner of the funds on deposit or whether the cus-
tomer wants others to have a prorated interested in the deposit account.
The customer should be asked if the customer is opening the account
for another person who actually owns the account and, if so, in what
capacity. Is the customer a parent or guardian, a custodian under the
West Virginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, a trustee, an executor,
an administrator, or an attorney in fact? The customer should be asked
who he or she wants to control the account; .that is, who should have
the right of withdrawal or the right to write checks. If another is to
control but not own the account, then the customer should indicate
whether this agency has been established in a writing that should be
submitted to the bank. The customer should be asked who has an enti-
tlement to the account. Does the customer want his or her will to
determine who receives the funds? Does the customer want a joint
owner to receive the funds upon his or her death? Does the customer
want someone who does not have an ownership interest to have an
entitlement to the funds upon the death of the depositor?
Once the questionnaire is finished, the bank's representative can
check the answers for inconsistencies and, if no inconsistency is found,
can then determine what title and what contractual provisions satisfy
the expressed. intent of the customer. The questionnaire should be re-
tained for it stands as a documentation of the depositor's expressed
intent in establishing the account.
The bank should further provide certain notices to the depositor
about the effects of joint ownership, joint control and joint entitlement.
Such notices are now required for the issue of joint control, in that the
bank is required to state that any one party has the right of withdrawal
until a written notice to the contrary is received, and that the creditors
of one party to the account may attach both interests and that one
party to the account may pledge both interests.
Once the questionnaire is submitted and the notices are given, the
bank should receive the benefit of a conclusive presumption that the
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account is opened and administered in accord with the customer's in-
tent. A statutory provision to this effect would be appropriate.
Finally, the bank should encourage the customer to read the con-
tract of deposit and to ask whatever questions he or she may have. In
fact, the advice of the author has been that the customer should ex-
pressly acknowledge on the deposit contract that "the customer was
encouraged to read, and was given a reasonable opportunity to read"
the contract.' Of course, the bank must ensure that the acknowl-
edgement comports with the reality of the transaction with the custom-
er. Moreover, the bank must ensure that the contract is readily under-
standable and not unduly burdened with the foreign language of law-
yers. 1
2 9
In this fashion, and by mutually resolving the issues of ownership,
control and entitlement, the intent of the customer in opening the joint
account and the intent of the bank in administering the account should
readily and satisfactorily meld.
128. The author has further advised that the bank obtain an acknowledgment from the
customer that no other promises or representations regarding the deposit account have been
made to the customer that are not set forth in the contract.
129. This "plain language" requirement would also facilitate the bank's representatives'
understanding of, and explanation to customers of, the contractual provisions.
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